History of Sorts

Introduction

The Katyn Massacre remains one of the most tragic and controversial events of World War II. It was a mass execution carried out by the Soviet secret police (NKVD) in the spring of 1940, targeting thousands of Polish military officers, intellectuals, and other prominent figures. The event not only deepened Polish-Soviet hostilities but also shaped Cold War politics, with the truth about the massacre being suppressed for decades.

Background and Context

In September 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. While Germany took the western portion, the Soviet Union occupied the east. During this period, Soviet forces arrested thousands of Polish military personnel, government officials, and intellectuals, suspecting them of anti-Soviet activities.

By early 1940, approximately 25,000 Polish prisoners were held in various Soviet camps, including Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov. On March 5, 1940, the Soviet Politburo, led by Joseph Stalin, approved the execution of over 22,000 Polish prisoners, viewing them as a potential threat to Soviet control over occupied Poland.

The Massacre

The executions took place in several locations, with the most notorious being the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk. NKVD officers systematically executed prisoners with shots to the back of the head and buried them in mass graves. Other sites of execution included Kalinin (now Tver) and Kharkiv.

The victims included high-ranking officers of the Polish Army, policemen, lawyers, professors, doctors, and priests—individuals who represented the intellectual and military elite of Poland. The aim was to decimate Poland’s leadership and prevent any future resistance against Soviet rule.

Discovery and Denial

In April 1943, Nazi Germany announced the discovery of mass graves in Katyn Forest, attempting to use the event as anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union denied responsibility, blaming the massacre on the Nazis. The Allies, particularly Britain and the United States, chose to remain silent to maintain their wartime alliance with the USSR.

The Katyn massacre provided Nazi Germany with a significant propaganda opportunity to discredit the Soviet Union. On April 14, 1943, Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary:

“We are now using the discovery of 12,000 Polish officers, murdered by the GPU, for anti-Bolshevik propaganda on a grand scale. We sent neutral journalists and Polish intellectuals to the site. Their reports are gruesome. The Führer has authorized us to release a dramatic news item to the German press. I have instructed the widest possible use of the propaganda material. We shall be able to exploit it for a couple of weeks.”

The Germans seized on this to portray communism as a threat to Western civilization, securing a major propaganda victory.

The Soviet government swiftly denied the accusations, claiming the Polish prisoners had been engaged in construction work west of Smolensk before being captured and executed by German forces in August 1941. On April 15, in response to the initial German broadcast of April 13, the Soviet Information Bureau stated:

“Polish prisoners-of-war who in 1941 were engaged in construction work west of Smolensk… fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen.”

In April 1943, the Polish government-in-exile, led by Władysław Sikorski, demanded an investigation by the International Red Cross. In response, Stalin accused the Polish government of collaborating with Nazi Germany and severed diplomatic ties. The Soviet Union also intensified efforts to gain Western recognition for the pro-Soviet Union of Polish Patriots, led by Wanda Wasilewska.

In July 1943, Sikorski died in an air crash—an event that proved politically convenient for Allied leaders.

In January 1944, the Soviet Union dispatched the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders to the Katyn site—a name that strongly implied its predetermined conclusion. The commission was led by Nikolai Burdenko, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and is often referred to as the Burdenko Commission.

The commission, composed solely of Soviet officials, including writer Aleksey Nikolayevich Tolstoy, conducted exhumations and rejected the 1943 German findings that the Polish officers had been executed by the Soviet NKVD. Instead, it attributed the massacre to Nazi forces in the autumn of 1941. Lacking concrete evidence, the commission also accused the Germans of executing Russian prisoners of war who had been forced to dig the mass graves. It remains uncertain how many commission members were genuinely misled by falsified reports and how many suspected the truth but complied under pressure. Historians Anna Cienciala and Wojciech Materski suggest that the commission had no choice but to align its findings with the Merkulov-Kruglov Report, which dictated the Soviet narrative. Burdenko himself is believed to have privately acknowledged the cover-up before his death in 1946. The commission’s conclusions were upheld by Soviet sources until April 13, 1990, when the Soviet government officially admitted responsibility for the massacre.

That same month, the Soviets invited a group of more than a dozen journalists, mostly American and British, to visit the Katyn site. Among them were Kathleen Harriman, daughter of U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and John F. Melby, third secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Some viewed their inclusion as a Soviet attempt to lend credibility to their version of events.

Melby’s report highlighted major flaws in the Soviet case, including unreliable witnesses, efforts to discourage questioning, and obviously rehearsed testimony. He noted that “the show was put on for the benefit of the correspondents.” Nonetheless, at the time, he found the Soviet narrative convincing. Harriman’s report reached a similar conclusion, though both were later questioned about why their official assessments seemed at odds with their findings. Many journalists present remained skeptical, recognizing the staged nature of the Soviet presentation. Meanwhile, some Western Communists actively propagated Soviet claims.

The growing tensions between Poland and the Soviet Union began to strain Western-Soviet relations. However, by this stage of the war, Poland’s strategic importance to the Allies had diminished with the growing involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt found themselves caught between their commitments to their Polish ally and the demands of Stalin.

According to Polish diplomat Edward Bernard Raczyński, he and General Władysław Sikorski privately met with Churchill and British official Alexander Cadogan on April 15, 1943, presenting evidence of Soviet responsibility. Raczyński recalled that while Churchill did not explicitly confirm his belief, his demeanor suggested he had no doubt. Churchill reportedly remarked, “The Bolsheviks can be very cruel.”

Yet, on April 24, Churchill assured the Soviets, “We shall certainly oppose vigorously any ‘investigation’ by the International Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such an investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism.”

While classified British reports concluded that Soviet guilt was a “near certainty,” maintaining the alliance with the USSR took precedence over moral considerations. Official British policy supported the Soviet version of events, even censoring contradictory accounts. Churchill tasked diplomat Owen O’Malley with investigating, but in a note to the Foreign Secretary, he cautioned: “All this is merely to ascertain the facts because we should none of us ever speak a word about it.”

O’Malley’s findings exposed inconsistencies and implausibilities in the Soviet narrative, further reinforcing doubts about their version of the massacre.

After the war, the Soviet Union maintained its false narrative, and any attempts to discuss Katyn in Poland were suppressed under communist rule. It was only in 1990 that the Soviet government, under Mikhail Gorbachev, officially admitted Soviet responsibility for the massacre.

Impact and Legacy

The Katyn Massacre had a profound impact on Polish-Soviet relations and remains a symbol of Soviet repression. The tragedy fostered deep-seated mistrust and resentment, influencing Poland’s political stance even after the fall of communism.

Memorials and investigations into the massacre continue today, as historians and political leaders work to preserve the memory of the victims. In 2010, a tragic plane crash near Smolensk killed Polish President Lech Kaczyński and other top officials en route to commemorate the Katyn anniversary, further deepening the historical wounds.

The Katyn Massacre stands as a grim reminder of the brutality of totalitarian regimes and the suppression of truth for political gain. Even today, it remains a sensitive subject in Polish-Russian relations, underscoring the lasting impact of historical injustices. By remembering Katyn, we honor the victims and reaffirm the importance of historical truth and justice.

Sources

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katyn_massacre

https://www.britannica.com/event/Katyn-Massacre

The Katyn Massacre – Mechanisms of Genocide

https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/katyn-massacre

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205230049

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-admit-to-katyn-massacre